

MIKOŁAJ ŁĄCKI

Ninth day of the trial

Witness Mikołaj Łącki, 58, doctor of medicine, residing in Warsaw at Chmielna Street 28,
relationship to the parties: none

Presiding Judge: Please, tell the Tribunal briefly, clearly, and concisely what you know about the case.

Witness: – During the occupation I was the head of the Polish health service. There were three health services in Warsaw: German, Polish and Jewish. The Polish health service oversaw the health of the residents of Warsaw and cooperated with the Jewish health service until 15 December 1940. Around this time the ghetto was closed and the health service was divided into two parts. There was no more cooperation.

I must say that the German authorities caused a typhus epidemic twice by inadequate regulations and their inadequate implementations.

Presiding Judge: – This was not the cause of the ghetto, but the result.

Witness: – The ordinance concerning the ghetto caused the development of the epidemic. However logical the said ordinance was, perhaps [even] partially right, but in practice it directly contributed to the entire development of the epidemic.

The beginnings of typhus in Warsaw date back to December 1939. According to orders issued by the German authorities, Jews were not allowed to be treated in Polish hospitals, nor Poles in Jewish hospitals. In October, there was a rapid transfer of patients both ways and the Jewish hospital at Dworska Street was unbelievably packed with ill people. I reported

it more than once to the German physicians: Dr. Schrempf and Rychter, the military doctor, who oversaw the sanitary condition of Warsaw.

I predicted that an epidemic had to break out. Jews were lying in the hospital in unbelievable conditions; in their own clothes, sometimes on beds without mattresses, sometimes on straw, covered only with their own clothes, the number of newly admitted patients reached up to 260 people a day. We were unable to bathe and delouse all of them. I noticed the effects of pediculosis [lice infection]. So cases of the disease were frequent. About ten cases were reported immediately, and closer to 15 December, there were 45 cases. This epidemic did not break out in the hospital, but in the hospital it was quickly diagnosed as a result of daily observation. At the same time, I reported on the incredibly poor housing conditions in the ghetto. It had been created at the beginning of October, it kept being narrowed down, and people deprived of almost everything – clothes, underwear, blankets – were still arriving there. They were placed in synagogues, schools and sometimes in larger apartments.

It was so crowded that at Muranowska Street 5, and in the synagogue on Dzielna Street, there were up to 300 people in one room. People had nothing to sleep on. Some slept on straw, others on the bare floor.

This was the beginning of a horrible epidemic. Orders that were theoretically right caused this epidemic in practice.

When combating it, we came across technical difficulties. There were not enough disinfectors to disinfect everything. I was trying to take only as much as we could process. The order was, however, to transport everything to the sanitary facility on Spokojna Street 15, and after Christmas, there were up to 600,000 kilograms of things squeezed together. We were unable to process them and Dr. Schrempf demanded to keep them until we processed it. We did it within three weeks. During this time, people could not get basic things. Of course, after such a terrible regulation, people began to avoid such orders and no longer carry them out.

At the same time, the epidemic began to spread; there were cases of typhus: 93 in December 1939 (5 Poles and 88 Jews), 98 in January 1940, 208 in February, 337 in March, 374 in May, and 137 in June. The epidemic started to decrease in June.

We came into contact with the Jewish health service and asked them to carry out an operation of delousing the Jewish population. The operation began. At that time, we had 500

disinfectors and about 30 special ambulances that could process up to 4000 people a day. The Jewish population followed our orders willingly, so that in July, August, and September a lot of people were deloused and the number of cases of typhus went down. There were 28 cases in August, 28 cases in September, 28 cases in October, 27 cases in November, and 14 cases in December (12 Jews and 2 Poles). In 1940, we made 1.5 million disinfections, 80% of which concerned the Jewish population.

More or less in the middle of December, at the time when the ghetto was closed [16 November 1940], there was practically no typhus epidemic in Warsaw. To say more, during the first four days [after closing the ghetto] there were no cases of typhus in the ghetto.

In January 1945, there were 53 cases in all of Warsaw. [no data] ... of this were Jews arrested in Pawiak prison, which means that in 1941 there was no typhus epidemic at all in the ghetto. The degree of the pediculosis [infestation of lice] among the Jews had dropped as well, but in February, resettlement in the ghetto began again.

I was in the ghetto very often as the manager of the Polish health service, to settle different matters and to consult with colleagues from the Jewish health service. I must say here that only those who came there often, and immediately went back out, could understand the terrible misery of the people living there. In 1939, it seemed to me that the Jews who resettled in the ghetto were deprived of everything. However, when I saw what was happening in 1941, I understood that they had been in a much better situation then, because they came on their own; and those [in 1941] were [typically] imprisoned. Here, only starving and half-alive people were coming. Pediculosis was terrible in the ghetto, and the epidemic began to develop slowly for the second time.

In March, we had 194 cases of diagnosed typhus, 237 in April, 820 in June, 2600 in July, [no data available] in September, and 3200 in October. At the same time, as a result of contact between the ghetto and Warsaw, the epidemic began to spread to the rest of the city. We ended 1940 with 161 cases of diagnosed typhus, whereas in 1941 we had 3190 such cases. We had warned about the consequences of resettlement [to the ghetto] on several occasions. I can say that representatives of the Jewish community, Czerniaków [head of the Judenrat] and the head of health service Dr. Milejowski, went to the *Amstarzt* [medical officer] several times to inform about the situation, and the *Amstarzt* submitted a report. I have one such report for the governor from 2 July, which describes the terrible

conditions in the ghetto at that time. This report, by Dr. Hagen from 7 June 1941, gives the number of typhus cases diagnosed in the ghetto and lists their causes; namely, lack of coal in the ghetto and the closure of bathhouses; no soap, so one cannot disinfect and wash the newcomers; [and] hospitals and transit camps have no resources.

That was the report of the German medical officer. The number he quoted, 14,000 during the whole year, is not exact because in July people stopped [witness probably meant started] avoiding the hospital. In line with the ordinance of Prof. Kudickes – director of the National Institute of Hygiene – who was *Beauftragter* [inspector], blood tests were carried out on corpses and it turned out that 10–12% of deaths were caused by typhus, which means that the patient died before the external symptoms manifested themselves. Thus, we have 10–12% of deaths that were not reported as due to typhus in the ghetto, and the proportion of typhus cases among Jews was 10–11%; so the number of typhus cases could have been around 60,000. In German such a situation is called *Durchseuche* – the whole population is infected and the epidemic only abates when there is no more “combustible material”. People get ill, die, the rest become immune. From January to June, the number of deaths in Warsaw was 13,200, whereas in the ghetto it was almost 31,000 in the first four months of 1942. Before the war, in all of Warsaw, with a population of 1.3 million inhabitants, there were approximately 10,500 such cases. The medical officer wrote that this unparalleled starvation can only be overcome by a significant improvement of living conditions.

The specter of hunger hangs over the Jewish population.... In this memorandum there is proof that the National Institute of Hygiene, whose head was Prof. Kudicke, ascertains the lack of elementary resources to combat the epidemic (reads the first sentence in German). This memorandum was addressed directly to Fischer [Governor of the Warsaw District in the General Government] for the purpose of issuing ordinances. Project[ion] of these ordinances was completely logical and went in the following directions: increase the amount of coal, soap, food, give medicines, supply hospitals, etc. The report states an unprecedented starvation, which is why this epidemic has developed and spread out to the rest of Warsaw and even to other parts of the country. In this situation, it made an impression of something planned, at some point should *zmie* [edge cut off] everything was practically accepted, but it remained the same, or even worse. In 1942, the epidemic began to fade and the number of cases [of disease] decreased in the ghetto. Actually, at the moment when they started taking out Jews from the ghetto, there was no typhus epidemic, because the number of cases in

May was 203, and 118 in June. The Jewish population endured an epidemic and the ghetto was no longer dangerous for the surrounding population.

I must point out one thing, absolutely biased. It was the end of 1942 or the beginning of 1943. On Wiejska Street there was an exhibition entitled "Healthy man" and one section was about the issue of typhus and the connection of typhus to the Jewish population. Apart from the fact that the Jewish population, as well as any other, absolutely does not have any special correlation with typhus, and only louse are carriers, there were two big mistakes in the exhibition. There was one graph showing the development of the disease, which was caused by a beggar who lived on Płocka Street 1/3. However, Płocka Street 1/3 is a square where there are no houses. The second address was at Płocka Street 26 – this is the Wolski Hospital, where there were no Jews at all. These ordinances, which were carried out against the Jewish population with incredible cruelty, made our work and cooperation very difficult. For example, it is known that clothes louse are the main carrier of typhus. Some women had long braids and head lice. Head lice does not carry typhus. However, there was an order to cut [the hair of] these women even when there were no lice, but only nits [the egg of louse].

It was enough to suspect the nits because of the presence of dandruff, which could be confusing especially in the evening hours. Women were bald-headed and they reacted desperately and desired to escape.

The second terrible thing was the closing of houses. Typhus does not spread through the air. It is associated only with clothes louse. So closing the whole house and bathing all residents was an absolutely pointless order, which made work awkward for paramedics; also, it could cause the spreading of infected lice as a result of the contact of clean people with lice-infested ones. Houses were closed for fourteen days. Fourteen days without food supplies meant starvation to many people, and it was completely impossible to help them with other diseases such as pneumonia or kidney stones.

All in all, there were two reasons for the typhus development in the ghetto. The first was transferring people to the ghetto, to very bad conditions, which made the cooperation and usage of bathing areas in other districts of the city impossible for the Jewish population. When the health service fought the epidemic in 1940, there was a massive outbreak of epidemics in 1941. This was the summer type of epidemics, which is unprecedented in any literature. The culmination of illness was in September and October, and there was

a decrease in December and January. This is a proof that the epidemic was artificially caused due to orders that seemed to be somewhat purposeful.

One more thing. Polish health services had bath areas near the ghetto at: Leszno Street 93, Leszno Street 96, and Spokojna Street 15. However, it was absolutely impossible to bring a Jewish population there for two reasons. First of all, the escorts sometimes shot people when they thought they wanted to escape. Because there were cases of shooting, the population avoided going to bathing areas. It became too risky for them. On the other hand, there were incidents at the bathing area on Leszno Street 93 – I do not know the type of weapon or who it was – but they were SS men who, for reasons unknown to us (we could never determine it), beat up naked bathers in horrible ways. After two such incidents, we asked the Jewish health service not to send ill people [there] any more, because it causes unfortunate accidents. I do not know what happened then, I just know that the massacre was terrible.

Presiding Judge: – Do you know what the result of this report was, which you have read from? Did the German authorities do something with this evil demonstrated there? Has anything changed?

Witness: – Nothing has changed. It was mainly about coal, and there was still no coal; the same regarding disinfectants. Some of this we could bring to the ghetto illegally, however, considering that it was mainly a matter of sulfur – and for the disinfestation of one room you need about three kilograms of sulfur – it is understandable that whatever we got from smuggling was not enough.

Presiding Judge: – Could you please give the German doctor's report to the Tribunal?

(Witness gives the report to the court)

Presiding Judge: – How did you get this document?

Witness: – I gave the materials to a German doctor for writing this report, and I received one copy.

Presiding Judge: – Was it reported to the head of the district?

Witness: – From the first two pages of the report, I conclude that the report was submitted to the Governor. This was the third report. Its content shows that there were reports

submitted in April and in May as well. The third one was submitted in June. In consultation with the Jewish health service, we pointed out, that the epidemic is growing and there is an incredible number of cases. Unfortunately, everything came true.

Judge Grudziński: – Were these monthly reports of typhus?

Witness: – Daily.

Judge Grudziński: – Did the German doctor know that, at the turn of November and December 1940, the disease curve was falling?

Witness: – Yes, he did. We were submitting daily reports to the medical officer. More or less until 15 December, when the health service in Warsaw was managed by *Amtsarzt*, there were daily reports.

After 15 December, reports from the ghetto were submitted by the Jewish health service.

Judge Grudziński: – So when the reports were submitted, the German doctor knew that the typhus curve was falling constantly?

Presiding Judge: – Defendant Fischer, do you know the content of this report?

(Presiding Judge shows the report to the defendant)

Defendant Fischer: – This report, in the original version and in this volume, is not known to me. I think it was for the health department. However, I received current reports on sanitary conditions from the health department. These reports, based the Jewish doctors' reports, were submitted to me every day. Then, I tried to provide help as much as I could. I was submitting proper reports to the government. A report about the government session, submitted by Dr. Hummels, which is in the court files, shows that I had tried to provide more food and cleaners. Every day, then, I held meetings relating to the situation in the ghetto. When the government rejected the request to increase food rations, I was bringing food to the ghetto from the free trade, whenever it was possible. I have banned all combating this trade. I gave a hint to the post office to let all the packages that were destined for the ghetto to be passed through. The police wanted to oppose it, but it was done anyway.

The food and agriculture department constantly sent special food allowances to the ghetto. So I really tried to do everything that was possible, but I did not have the power to

increase food allowances. Czerniaków, the Jewish mayor, visited me twice. I allowed him to make purchases in the countryside. Difficulties had arisen because Jews were constantly transported from the Reich and it was not reported to us at all. No one even asked us if these people could be received. Of course, these activities had made it very difficult for us to help.

I think that in monthly reports until 1942, available to you, prosecutors, these relations are visible.

Judge Grudziński: – Doctor, have you been the manager of the public health service?

Witness: – Yes, I have.

Judge Grudziński: – Who were your contacts in the German health service?

Witness: – At the beginning it was prof. Rychter, then Dr. Schrempf, then Dr. Hagen, [and then] with Dr. Janik.

Judge Grudziński: – And besides [them], you did not come into contact with other doctors?

Witness: – With nobody, except government doctors.

Judge Grudziński: – Could you please submit the list of cases from 1940?

Witness: – I have one copy, but I would like to ask for the possibility to make a transcript [to keep for myself].

Presiding Judge: – You can send it to the Court tomorrow.

Attorney Śliwowski: – Was Dr. Hagen the first doctor who had control over the health service for the German authorities?

Witness: – He was the third, after Dr. Rychter and Dr. Schrempf.

Attorney Śliwowski: – Dr. Rychter was a military man; I mean, who was the doctor for the civil authorities?

Witness: – Dr Schrempf and Dr. Hagen, who started working from 15 January 1941.

Attorney Śliwowski: – Was there a difference in behavior between these two doctors?

Witness: – There was a huge difference. Dr. Schremppf was violent and cruel, whereas Dr. Hagen was more humane and tried to act according to logic and medical consciousness. It comes out more or less from the report I have just given to the Court. It emphasized the misery prevailing in the ghetto, the deficiency of medicines, disinfectors, ordinary coal, clothes, etc., and asked for permission to carry out the petition made by the Jewish health service.

Attorney Śliwowski: – Would you describe the reports you have referred to as human and objective?

Witness: – Yes, in a huge part of it.

Presiding Judge: – Were they based on data that you presented to Dr. Hagen?

Witness: – Yes, but there was one thing in this report that shows abnormality. From the point of view of our Polish health service, it was cruel. There was a paragraph saying that Jews who wanted to leave the ghetto should be shot down. We absolutely could not solidarize with this. On the other hand, the first paragraph about replenishment was completely right and logical.

Attorney Śliwowski: – About this paragraph, you were not completely accurate, because in the text I have in front of me I can read: “Jews leaving the Jewish quarter should get the corporal punishment and amercement [fine] for holders, whereas loitering Jews should be shot down”.

Witness: – In any case, we could not solidarize with such a regulation.

Attorney Śliwowski: – What happened later with Dr. Hagen?

Presiding Judge: – Question overruled.

Attorney Śliwowski: – Which German institution was Dr. Hagen subordinate to?

Witness: – He was directly subordinate to *Stadthauptmann* [town major] and then to the district physician.

Attorney Śliwowski: – Do you not know that Dr. Schremppf used the *District Arzt* [District Physician] title?

Witness: – It was possible, but only at the beginning. Later there was a complete demarcation and Dr. Schrempf [became] the *Arzt* of Warsaw.

Presiding Judge: – I must order a break. I'm asking you, Doctor, to come at 4:00 PM, because there are questions for you.

(after a break)

Presiding Judge: – I hereby resume the court trial. Please, call for witness Łącki.

(Witness Łącki comes in).

Prosecutor Siewierski: – Could you please describe what was the approach of the occupational authorities towards the issue of health in the rest of Warsaw? What regulations reduced the range of treatment and [were] inconsistent with the rules of medical ethics?

Witness: – The first regulation, which in my opinion [was] inconsistent with the rules of medical ethics, was the prohibition of providing medical assistance to the Jewish population. This order was announced around mid-October. It was forbidden to accept Jewish people in health centers, with the exception of venereal diseases. The admission of people suffering from venereal diseases lasted more or less until the ghetto was closed.

The next very important order in Warsaw was to issue the highly deficient food cards. Let me introduce the tables (the witness gives tables to the Presiding Judge) illustrating the amount of calories that an average citizen received per day. Here you need to distinguish between two cases, the calculation of net and gross calories. Food products that were given to the people of Warsaw were mostly carbohydrates, i.e., potatoes and bread. Potatoes were of very poor quality (it was in 1940, 1941, 1942), so the value in use was at least thirty – maybe more – percent lower than it was set in these tables. But in these tables, still the number of calories did not reach more than a little over five hundred [per person] in 1941.

The next thing: the calculation did not take into account the poor quality of bread, which contained a lot of water, more than the chemical regulations allowed, so the overall value was much smaller. As a result of this poor nutrition and the lack of proteins and fat, there was a colossal increase of tuberculosis cases. Tuberculosis in Warsaw before the war caused

approximately 150–155 deaths per 100,000 people. Since 1939, this number started to increase rapidly, and in 1943, it reached 550 deaths per 100,000 people. This exceeded the number of deaths before the war by about 3.5 to 4 times more. I must point out here, that these are the number of registered deaths. Because life in Warsaw was very difficult, ill people usually left for the countryside or for the province, where it was easier to get food. So, the real number of deaths was even higher.

Then, our health service was interested in who dies from tuberculosis. In 1940–1941, deaths mostly concerned older people over 40 years old. Whereas in 1942–1943, the curve of deaths shifted towards younger generations, so that people between 15 and 30 years old were suffering and dying from tuberculosis. So, a lot of people died in the most socially and economically important age.

Difficulties in combating tuberculosis were associated with the fact that numerous infirmaries were taken away. Before the war, Warsaw used to send ill people to numerous infirmaries outside the city: to Zakopane, Rabka (for children), Busko, etc. In 1940, we still used them (except for Zakopane), but in 1942, there was a colossal disturbance in our action due to the ban on sending tuberculosis patients to Zakopane, and due to taking away Rabka, Busko, Rokicin, and the important urban sanatorium in Otwock, where almost 250 people were treated. In these conditions, the fight against tuberculosis at the end of 1942–1943 was, in fact, only nominal for adults, because Warsaw had absolutely nothing; except for the sanatorium in Rudka, which hosted about 90 patients with tuberculosis, and the sanatorium in Świder. Maybe children were in a slightly better situation, but adults were doomed – maybe I will say it too harshly – to extinction. We could do nothing about these colossal needs.

Presiding Judge: – There was neither climatotherapy nor clinical treatment?

Witness: – Warsaw [before the war] had 600 beds with 150 deaths; now [during the war] it had 180 [beds] with 500 deaths, i.e. when the needs were three times larger, the number of beds actually decreased three times. This disproportion was so colossal that in 1942/1943 – no final data from 1944 – tuberculosis started to decimate the population, and the younger generation began to die.

The health service kept a close eye on children to determine what the state of tuberculosis was.

Among children from elementary classes, on the first and the second grade, the average number of infected people was 60%; for children over 10 years [of age], the state of tuberculosis was even higher. Here, I would like to emphasize this terrible moment of helplessness: the demand for treatment increased, while the possibilities [of treatment] were still decreasing.

Presiding Judge: – Did the Polish sanitary authorities make appropriate representations to the German authorities in this situation ?

Witness: – Many times, but we were always met with a refusal. For example, in 1941, after taking away the B rius sanatorium, which is located in the city of Otwock, the Polish health service applied to combine all infirmaries together into a whole (namely the city sanatorium, B rius; Zofiówka sanatorium for the mentally ill, which was also nearby; and the Olin sanatorium; all together with an area of approximately sixty hectares) and create a complex for eight hundred people. Dr. Hagen made every effort to make this happen, unfortunately, the sanatoriums B rius and Zofiówka, which belonged to the Jewish commune, passed into the possession of the SS and nothing could be done.

Presiding Judge: – Were the district authorities informed about these conditions?

Witness: – Of course.

Prosecutor Siewierski: – Do you, as the manager of this department of the City Council, have any observations about the *Stadthauptmann* Leist's personal approach to the Polish people (from how they were treated, to providing for their needs, or to possible defense against any claims of other authorities)? Or maybe he was just not interested in these things? What can you tell us about it?

Witness: – I had the impression that he was uninterested in it. He was not as violent and cruel as Dr. Schrempf, but there have been some interventions about the very wrong allocations of food products. Potatoes are a poor food, but good species [of potato] have certain calories, and in 1941–1942 they were very helpful to feed people. However, the potato allowances were terrible and from year to year did not improve even in a quality sense. It was possible, even without increasing the amount of the allowances, not to give such a poor quality species [of potato].

Prosecutor Siewierski: – However, I would like to hear something more specific. Have you seen any personal efforts of Leist to improve treating Poles in the field of self-government?

Witness: – I have never met Leist, and all cases that I dealt with were run only by *Amtsarzt*.

Prosecutor Sawicki: – Could you tell us in general whether the activities of the German administration, in the field that you know, have contributed to the deterioration of the health of the population or not?

Witness: – For me, there is no doubt that the general administration significantly contributed to the deterioration of the health status of the population, and especially to the most vital and most economically important part of it – young people. At the meeting of school doctors in the Health And Social Care Center, which took place three weeks ago, all school doctors from all over Warsaw emphasized that the pupils' health is especially [bad] in the elementary class. This is explained by the poor nutrition of infants and growing children who survived the worst period of occupation.

Prosecutor Sawicki: – Therefore, the second question: could you prove that this deterioration of health is far beyond what could have been caused only by war? The state of health could get worse, where even our own administration would have to tolerate. We must be objective. Could you tell us, based on data, about what happened during the occupation from the German administration, if it exceeds the maximum that is normal in war conditions. Could you please answer this question?

Witness: – I have in front of me a report about the occupied countries and the Reich countries from 1942. According to the report, in the Reich the mortality rate for tuberculosis for the German population hardly increased in 1942. Before the war, there was a mortality [rate] of 65 [persons] per a 100,000 [person] population, and in 1942, it was 67.5. Then, I know data from Denmark, where mortality has hardly increased as well.

Prosecutor Sawicki: – When we compare decreasing the health state of the civilian population from other countries, and in particular within the Reich itself, to the state that was in Poland, can we draw a conclusion that the administration operating here contributed to the deterioration of the state of health regardless of the war, especially in the Jewish population.

Witness: – In my understanding, the administration has contributed to a huge deterioration of the health state of the population of the city of Warsaw.

Presiding Judge: – Did you know, as a doctor, what food allowances the German population received in Warsaw?

Witness: – Yes, I knew it unofficially.

Presiding Judge: – What was the relation of these German food allowances to the Polish food allowances?

Witness: – These allowances were as follows: Jews received on average 250 calories a day in 1941. According to data that I cannot present at the moment, because I lost them, Germans received 2.5 thousand calories a day; but there was one difference, the quality of the products. 2.5 thousand calories for Germans were indeed in good quality – there was fat, milk, etc. I have no doubts, because I saw in the *Amtsarzts* office, officials receiving milk and butter, and the civilian population of Warsaw never got any of these.

Presiding Judge: – I understood that the German population received 2.5 thousand calories, the Polish population about 500, and the Jewish about 250 calories, but, because of the quality of the products served to Poles and Jews, the number of calories that should be obtained with the normal nutritional value of these products was reduced.

Witness: – Yes, indeed. The worst bread was provided to the ghetto. The Jewish health service ordered the bread examination. Normally a kilogram of wholemeal bread must have more than 2 thousand calories. Our bread contained about 1.8–1.7 thousand calories, but in the ghetto, tested bread contained no more than 1.1–1.15 thousand calories. So by weight it was bread, but there was so much substitute for calories that even a theoretical 220–250 calories could not be achieved; it's hard to say how many net calories it really had.

Prosecutor Sawicki: – And how many calories do we normally have to consume?

Witness: – Based on the resolution of the international commission from 1935, we normally have to consume 3,000 gross calories. Considering 15% of waste, it must be a net of 2.4–2.5 thousand calories.

Prosecutor Sawicki: – So, if we would only live with what the German authorities gave us during the occupation, we should all die?

Witness: – In a very short time. And only with smuggling we could increase allowances. On the other hand, smuggling had its disadvantages. There was an excessive squeeze in queues, crowds, and the danger of spreading illness outside the city.

Attorney Śliwowski: – Question to the witness. You talked about the efforts of Dr. Hagen, it seems, about the sanatorium in Otwock. I would like to ask for a repetition because I did not understand what Dr. Hagen was trying to do?

Witness: – Dr. Hagen was trying to combine three sanatoriums into one. There is an area of about three hectares. On one part there was the Olin sanatorium for children, on the second part the Brius sanatorium, and Nina, a Jewish sanatorium for tuberculosis patients. Well-designed and well-maintained. Finally, Zofiówka, a mental hospital and a city sanatorium with two hundred beds. The idea was to get these three sanatoriums together in this area because of the terrible lack of space, however, Brius and Zofiówka were occupied by the SS and not used. We could not get permission. If I am allowed to express my supposition, this was the direct reason for Dr. Hagen's collapse, forcing him to join the army immediately.

Presiding Judge: – But the initiative of joining these three "guesthouses" came on the Polish part, not Dr. Hagen's?

Witness: – All applications had to be submitted to Hagen.

Presiding Judge: – But I'm asking if the initiative came from him?

Witness: – The initiative came from us. As for the names, it came from Dr. Orzechowski, director of hospital management, and from me.

Presiding Judge: – All applications were handed over to the German authorities?

Witness: – Yes, they were.

Attorney Śliwowski: – Did Dr. Hagen try very hard to make this initiative a reality?

Witness: – Yes, very hard.

[...]

Witness: – Approach to the Department of Education. Municipal Council paid attention to the school, to children at school age. At the beginning, in November 1939, Dr. Schrempf

ordered to abolish school hygiene. These conditions lasted for several months. It was not until the beginning of February or March, that doctors were engaged in a different character to fight epidemics. At the time when [the Polish] zloty decreased in value, the city budget automatically increased, except for one thing in this budget – school hygiene and doctors' wages. With all certainty I must state, we have seen the negative attitude towards a child quite clearly.

Attorney Śliwowski: – I have a question for the defendant Leist.

Witness: – I do not know what particular people did. As the health service manager, it was my duty to state a current status, and I do not know what kind of person it depended on. I can say one thing: that the number of calories in Warsaw was insufficient. It was bad in quantity, even worse in quality, there was no fat, no protein, and as a result, mortality increased, mainly due to tuberculosis. I do not know who is guilty, my duty is to inform about the situation.

Prosecutor Siewierski: – The defendant Leist reproaches you for not reporting to him at the time and for not intervening in the matter of improving feeding. Was this thing considered in the Polish Municipal Council? Was intervention at all possible, and was it possible to predict the effect of it?

Witness: – There was no such intervention on my part. However, I intervened with *Amtsarzt*, and also with the president of the city, who, as I know, put this matter above all else. I used the chain of command. On the one hand, I reported to a German physician, and on the other hand, I submitted reports to the Polish superior and the intervention went on.

Presiding Judge: – Thank you.